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Abstract
South Africa has a relatively youthful population hut ageing 
is nonetheless an important economic issue. The number o f 
older persons is increasing rapidly, as the population starts 
the ageing processfrom alow base. The care o f  the white eld­
erly in the pastfollowed an expensive institution-based model 
that is now making way fo r  a more affordable model based on 
greater integration o f older people in the community. Both 
occupational/privatepensions and means-tested social pen­
sions fo r  poor individuals are remarkably advanced fo r  a 
middle-income developing country and the integration o f 
these two modes o f social securityfor retirement, in which the 
means test plays a crucial role, is problematic.
Introduction
As South African fertility levels until recently remained rela­
tively high, the population has a youthful structure, though 
demographic change, including rising life expectancy, is 
causing a rapid increase in the number of older persons (cf, 
Kinsella & Ferreira, 1997). However, the number still 
remains relatively small compared to the overall population. 
The major economic issue flowing from ageing in South 
Africa is not that faced by developed market economies, i.e, 
an inordinate economic burden that has to be borne by a rela­
tively small economically-activc population, but rather how 
best to deal with the increasing number of old people in tenns 
of the provision of care and retirement funding. Care for the 
elderly has evolved along a model of institution-based care 
for the section of the population, i.e. whites, that was most 
privileged under the system of apartheid. Unlike other devel­
oping countries, South Africa has a surprisingly developed 
social-security system (Van der Merwe, 1996: 296, 318; 
Alber, 1982: 64, Table 4).1
This paper addresses two major economic issues 
surrounding ageing in South Africa, namely care for the 
elderly and retirement provision. Discussion of the latter 
issue, which is treated more fully as it is least well known, is 
best undertaken by breaking the topic into three segments: 
occupational (and private) insurance for retirement; social 
old-age pensions a form of social assistance targeted at poor 
older individuals; and the interaction between these two, 
particularly relating to the means test and the tax dispensa­
tion.
Social care for the elderly
Like all welfare services, care of the elderly receives rela­
tively small allocations of budgetary resources from govern­
ment, either as direct spending or as subsidies for private wel­
fare organizations. Apartheid has left a legacy of welfare 
services that are highly discriminatory, inequitably distrib­
uted across provinces, not directed at communities, families 
or social integration, mainly rehabilitative rather than pre­
ventive, and often based on an inappropriate institution- 
based model. The White Paper on Social Welfare (1997) 
advocates addressing these problems by replacing the old 
welfare model with a family-centred developmental welfare 
model, with more attention given to generic welfare services.
Under apartheid, discrimination in spending on care of the 
elderly was greater than in any other sphere of social 
spending. Only R1.4 million of public resources was spent on 
social care of older blacks outside the homelands in 1991, as 
against R272 million spent on older whites. Of the 34 000 
places in homes for the aged, only 1 200 were for blacks (cf. 
Race Relations Survey, 1992/93: 304). Table 1 and Figure 1 
show that in 1993 -  the last year before democratization and 
the last year for which racially differentiated data were avail­
able -  expenditure outside the homelands on care of the 
elderly per member of the total population was some twenty 
times that for blacks. As more than half the black population 
resided in the homelands, and expenditure levels there were 
known to be much lower, racial differentials in spending on 
welfare services for the whole of South Africa were immense. 
Even allowing for a greater preponderance of older persons 
among whites (9.4 % of whites, as against only 3.5 % of 
blacks are 65 years or older), the remaining racial disparity 
ratio in spending per older person of seven to one was still 
greater than in any other area of social spending.
Table 1
Per capita spending by government on care of older 
persons, by race group, 1993 (excluding the 
homelands)
Spending per member of
Total population Population of 
pensionable age
Black R 3,02 R 92,15
Coloureds R 15,03 R 441,44
Indians R 2,17 R 63,36
Whites R 59,63 R 636,62
TOTAL R 17,72 R 377,07
Source: Calculated from Race Relations Survey, 1994 and Sadie 
1993.
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Source: Calculated from Race Relations Survey, 1994 and Sadie, 
1993.
The level of institution-based care of older whites is exces­
sive even for affluent societies. “By most countries’ stan­
dards South African whites use institutions to a much higher 
degree ...” (Lawton, 1989:14). While only five per cent of 
older Americans are in residential care, in the late 1980s the 
percentage in South Africa was 8 to 11 % for whites, 5 % for 
coloureds, 0.9 % for Indians and 0.6 % for blacks (Lawton, 
1989: 14, quoting the South African National Council for the 
Aged). Though more homes for the aged are needed to serve 
the neglected black population, the great cost and the need to 
keep older persons in the community for as long as possible 
should caution against too strong an emphasis on such an 
expensive model of caring for older persons (R11 000 to 
R22 000 per person per annum) -  one that is inappropriate for 
a country with South Africa’s limited resources. Already two 
out of every five Rand of public expenditure on social welfare 
services (including both government-provided services and 
subsidies to private welfare organizations) goes to the care of 
older persons (Figure 2). If expensive institutional care can 
largely be avoided, low administrative capacity and short­
ages of trained and experienced welfare workers may be 
more binding constraints in implementing the White Paper on 
Social Welfare. Issues here are how better to involve indi­
viduals, private service providers and the community, and 
how resources should be distributed amongst the provinces to 
equitably meet the needs of all older individuals.
Figure 2
Expenditure (including subsidies) for welfare services 
by field of service, 1995
Source: Data obtained from the Department of Welfare and Popula­
tion Development.
Social old-age pensions may well encourage poor families to 
retain older members in the household. Only twenty per cent 
of older whites live in multigenerational families, as opposed 
to about 60 per cent of both urban and rural blacks (Kinsella 
& Ferreira, 1997: 3). Pensioners have become the main 
income earners in many extended families. By enhancing 
their status, the pension may have slowed a trend of older 
blacks being cared for in homes for the aged (Case & Deaton, 
1996: 11) — but in urban areas there is strong evidence that a 
lack of care facilities may be responsible for this. A large sur­
vey among urban blacks in Gauteng found strong support for 
the notion that care of the elderly should be the responsibility 
of welfare organizations, churches and the state rather than 
the family: “... the urban black family regards itself as having 
a minor role to play in caring and making provision for the 
aged” (Chinkanda, 1989: 152).
The large racial disparities in the provision of welfare serv­
ices are also reflected in the provincial allocation of expendi­
ture for welfare services. Provinces with a large share of 
white and coloured people (especially the Western Cape, the 
Northern Cape and Gauteng) are far better served with insti­
tutions for the elderly than other provinces -  a legacy of the 
former racially-based allocations of funds. The Western 
Cape spends more than 2Vi times as much per capita on care 
of the elderly than the country as a whole and more than seven 
times as much as Mpumalanga, the worst served province. 
(See Figure 3.) Differential welfare needs cannot account for 
such large disparities between provinces. Thus a down­
scaling to more affordable levels of public funding of care for 
the elderly is necessary in the Western Cape, the Northern 
Cape and Gauteng, but care has to be taken not to cause the 
collapse of functioning institutions and services.
Figure 3
Spending per capita on care of older persons, by 
province, 1995
Source: Calculations based on data obtained from the Department of 
Welfare and Population Development.
South Africa is fortunate in having a vibrant network of pri­
vate providers of welfare services, but providers are less 
active in rural areas and services function better in more afflu­
ent sections of society. Many private providers arc presently 
under financial pressure. Greater funding to improve the sala­
ries of social workers and to attract more people to enter this 
field may undermine the financial capacity to provide welfare 
services, which are personnel intensive. The desired shift in 
financial resources to reach parity between provinces may
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over-stretch the capacity of some of the provinces that are at 
present poorly resourced. However, reprioritization within 
welfare will not necessarily immediately realise gains and the 
process should thus be seen as an incremental one.
Occupational and private retirement insurance
Although the first pension fund was introduced in the old 
Transvaal (South African) Republic as early as 1882, occupa­
tional retirement insurance only expanded rapidly to skilled 
(mainly white) employees in the 1920s. After the 1956 Pen­
sions Funds Act was passed to regulate retirement funds and 
to protect the interests of their members, occupational retire­
ment insurance widened in the 1960s and the early 1970s to 
include less skilled workers, while rapid economic growth 
drew many more workers into formal employment. As a 
result retirement fund membership (including private provi­
sion) grew at 7 % per annum for three and a half decades, 
from 923 000 in 1958 to 9 309 000 in 1993 (Smith Commit­
tee, 1995: D2.4a), but slowed to a still rapid 3.7% growth rate 
in the 1980s. However, these figures include extensive dupli­
cation where people belong to more than one fund.
Occupational retirement insurance plays a large role in 
contractual savings, which have made the South African 
insurance industry a giant. Assets of the 16 000 retirement 
funds alone amounted to 73 % of GDP in 1993 (Smith 
Committee, 1995: D2.16). In 1992, total benefits of R17.2 
billion were paid out by occupational retirement funds (R3.3 
of which were resignation and withdrawal benefits), 
compared to only R4,8 billion paid as social old-age pensions 
(Smith Committee, 1995: D2.1, 2.2, 2.6), though the latter 
target the poor.
Typically, workers and employers each contribute 7.5 % of 
the monthly wage to a fund from which workers can claim 
benefits upon retirement. Workers who change jobs often do 
not or cannot transfer benefits to another fund, and can then 
get a. certain share of the accumulated benefit paid out to 
them.
A mixture of convention and agreements between 
employers and workers has made occupational insurance for 
retirement the norm in the forma! sector and mandatory for 
employees in many firms and industries. Occupational insur­
ance may thus be regarded as social insurance, despite the 
absence of legal compulsion and mandatory preservation of 
benefits, but because contributions are not taxes that flow 
through state coffers, international fiscal comparisons 
usually understate social-security provision in South Africa. 
Coverage is still low in agriculture, in trade, in catering and 
accommodation services, and in domestic service. But 
although 73 % ofthe formally employed are covered by occu­
pational pension schemes for retirement, even after allowing 
for some double counting (Mouton Committee, 1992: 490; 
Smith Committee, 1995: D2.11), high unemployment means 
that only some 40 % of the labour force is covered (Kruger, 
1992a: 215; Smith Committee, 1995: D.2.11). In 1960, only 
1.6 % of older persons received benefits from retirement 
funds, as against 39.4 % who received social old-age 
pensions. By 1993, however, these figures had risen to 44.5 
and 78.7 %, respectively (Smith Committee, 1995: D2.8).
Although vital for many South Africans, occupational 
retirement insurance cannot cater to those outside paid 
employment, nor to those sections of the employed popula­
tion presently uncovered, and the majority of black workers 
therefore remain outside this security net. Of particular 
concern is that the interaction with the means test for social 
old-age pensions discourages many low-income workers 
from preserving retirement benefits, an issue which I return to 
below.
A government attempt in 1980 to implement compulsory 
preservation of pension rights upon withdrawal from a fund 
was abandoned in the face of strong opposition, as black 
workers perceived this as an attempt to deny them access to 
their own money (Mouton Committee, 1992: 153; Rumney, 
1988: 35). A typical unskilled worker in the secondary or 
tertiary sector accumulates a pension of about R40 per month 
(2 % of final salary) for every year that he/she belongs to a 
defined benefit retirement scheme. If he/she withdraws from 
the fund after ten years, the individual forfeits only R400 
occupational pension a month, less than the full social 
pension of R470 per month which he/she would then qualify 
for, and gets at least his/her own accumulated contribution 
and some interest back. Moreover, it is relatively sure that the 
social pension, unlike the occupational pension, may be 
expected to roughly keep pace with inflation. Thus there is 
little incentive for such an unskilled worker to preserve bene­
fits upon leaving a job.
Since the early 1980s trade unions have taken a more active 
interest in retirement benefits. Many provident rather than 
pension funds were established because low income workers 
who retire often prefer a lump-sum benefit to buy assets that 
are not penalised by the means test, such as land, cattle or a 
house (Basson, 1987:34). Pension fund members may 
receive at most a third of their benefits as a lump-sum pay-out 
on retirement and must take the rest as a monthly pension, 
whilst provident fund members may take their full benefit as a 
lump sum. Member contributions to a pension fund are 
untaxed but pensions are then taxed. For provident funds, 
however, earners pay the full income tax on their contribu­
tions but receive a substantial tax benefit when retiring. (Cf. 
Sephton, Cooper & Thomson, 1990: 26 et seq.)
Private retirement insurance in the form of retirement 
annuity funds has also grown rapidly in South Africa. Though 
the means test for social pensions makes private insurance 
unattractive for low-income earners, it often supplements or 
substitutes for occupational insurance amongst the affluent, 
particularly self-employed professionals.
Social old-age pensions
Social retirement assistance covers a larger population than 
occupational insurance. The different apartheid administra­
tions -  ten homelands, four provincial administrations that 
covered blacks outside the homelands, and a separate admini­
stration for each of the other three racial groups -  had some 
leeway to set rules and administrative procedures, but fund­
ing levels were essentially determined by the white central 
government. Today social retirement assistance is only 
administered by the nine provinces, but a single set of regula­
tions applies and it is funded through transfers from the cen­
tral budget. Its central feature is means-testing, which 
encourages a poverty trap and can in some circumstances cre­
ate perverse incentives, as will be discussed below.
Like other social-assistance programmes, South African 
social old-age pensions evolved in the period 1910 to 1933,
... during which there was significant innovation in the 
fie ld  o f state provision o f  social security in South Africa in 
the sense that many new schemes, previously unknown in 
the country, were introduced. The process, ifanything, was 
piecemeal and uncoordinated. In most instances Africans 
and Indians were excluded from benefits, and the unwill­
ingness o f white parliaments to use general government 
revenue in the financing o f services to Africans became 
clear andfound its way into legislative provisions (Kruger, 
1992a: 159).
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Military pensions were instituted from 1919, followed in 
1928 by social pensions for whites and coloureds that were 
subject to age criteria and a means test to ensure that mainly 
those uncovered by occupational retirement insurance were 
targeted. The exclusion of blacks was defended from the 
“civilized labour” perspective, that people accustomed to 
modem life-styles and consumption patterns had greater need 
of social protection than those in rural subsistence agricul­
ture.
Rural natives were excluded from old-age pensions mainly 
on the assumption that Native custom makes provision for  
maintaining dependent persons. Urban Natives were 
excluded in consequence, regardless o f their needs, owing 
'to the difficulty o f  applying any statutory distinction 
between them and other Natives ’ (South African Social 
Security Committee, 1944: 19).
By 1943, take-up rates of the pension were 40 % for whites 
and 56 % for coloureds (Social Security Committee, 1944: 
43-4, 58); only 4 % of all social-assistance spending was on 
blacks -  most of this targeted relief and pensions for the blind 
(Social Security Committee, 1944: 15). When the Smuts 
Government extended social old-age pensions to blacks in 
1944 (Van der Merwe, 1996: 378), benefit levels were less 
than a tenth of those of whites and the means test was far more 
stringent. But the introduction of old-age pensions was “to 
have a profound effect on the subsequent history of poverty in 
South Africa” (Iliffe, 1987: 141) and to obtain a pension 
became “a matter of survival for many poor South Africans” 
(Iliffe, 1987: 272). By 1958, blacks already comprised 60 % 
of 347 000 social old-age pensioners but received only 19 % 
of the pensions paid out. After their number had grown by 5 % 
a year for two decades, blacks made up 70 % of the 770 000 
pensioners in 1978 and received 43 % ofpensions. This latter 
proportion grew to 67 % in 1990 as a result of both increases 
in the number of blacks covered and the benefit level paid to 
blacks. By 1993, 81 % of social old-age pensioners were 
blacks.
The piecemeal social reforms of the 1970s and 1980s faced 
fiscal constraints that largely precluded increasing black 
benefits from social spending to white levels. Equalization 
was thus most readily accomplished where political resis­
tance to reducing white benefit levels was least. Social 
pensions fell into this category, because the small number of 
whites who qualified under the means test were poor and 
politically marginal. Sharply reducing real white pension 
levels along with some increases in fiscal allocations for 
social pensions allowed an increase in black pension benefit 
levels of 7.3 % per year in real terms from 1970 to 1993. In 
1980, white pensions displaced more than 30 % of the 
average wage in the non-primary sectors, compared to only 
8.6 % for black pensions. By 1993, when pension parity was 
achieved and discrimination in the application of the means 
test eliminated, the now unified pension displaced 15.5 % of 
the average wage (Van der Berg, 1994b). Moreover, partly 
due to tightening means-test criteria, progressively fewer 
whites qualified for social pensions. In 1996, the regulations 
of the apartheid period in the various administrations were 
replaced by a common set ofnon-discriminatory regulations.
Table 2 contains the last racial social-assistance data. It 
shows that social old-age pensions were by far the most 
important transfer in the early 1990s, reaching three-fifths of 
all recipients, or 1.5 million people, and that already benefits 
were widely spread, despite some discrimination that still 
applied, Relative to their total income, the poorer racial 
groups were most dependent on the social old-age pension.
Table 2
Social pensions and grants paid, by category and by 
race
Race group Total
Black Coloured Indian White
N u m b e r  o f  g r a n ts  
(1 0 0 0 s )  (1 9 9 3 )
Old-age 1 227 130 34 123 1 514
War veterans 4 5 0 9 18
Other 492 359 67 84 1 002
TOTAL 723 494 101 216 2 534
V a lu e  o f  g ra n ts  
( R ’m il l io n )  (1 9 9 0 )
Old-age and war 
veterans 1 753 290 69 491 2 603
Other 512 435 10B 227 1 281
TOTAL 2 265 725 177 718 3 884
P o p u la t io n  (1 0 0 0 s ) 28 780 3 286 987 5 068 38 121
O id -a g e  a n d  w a r  
v e te r a n s  p e n s io n s
Per member of 
population R 61 R 88 R 70 R 97 R 68
As % of all income 4.1 2.6 1.2 0.5 1,7
Sources: Calculated from figures obtained from the Department of 
National Health and Population Developmentand from Lund. 1993:9, 
Table 1 and accompanying text. For the TBVC homelands, equal 
numbers of recipients were assumed as in the other homelands. 
Income figures are own estimates.
Old-age pensions today reach about 75-80 % of the popula­
tion eligible by age (women from age 60 and men from age 
65). The 1993 figure may slightly underestimate coverage, 
which has grown so rapidly since, that growth has exceeded 
budgetary provisions in some provinces. (See Table 3.) High 
coverage reflects the widespread acceptance which this pro­
gramme enjoys, for today most non-recipients are excluded 
through eligibility criteria (the means test), rather than 
administrative obstruction or personal preference (stigma). 
The absence of such stigma in South Africa compared to Brit­
ain (Atkinson, 1983), for instance, may be due to the wide 
prevalence of the social old-age pension and the limited alter­
natives for poor older individuals. It should be noted that in 
1980, the pension take-up rate of whites was similar to that of 
the 1940s, although the rate was reduced by almost half in the 
following decade.
Table 3
Take-up rates of old-age pensions; percentages of 
pensioners relative to population of pensionable age, 







Sources: 1980 figures from Kruger, 1992b: 21. 1993 figures calcu­
lated from data supplied by the Department of National Health and 
Population Development and population data of Sadie, 1993.
In rural communities, pension income circulates widely and 
is crucial in combating poverty and reducing material insecu­
rity. It is probably the most effective social programme in tar­
geting and reaching economically-vulnerable groups
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(Ardington & Lund, 1995; Case & Deaton, 1996). Higher 
black pension levels to achieve racial parity have reduced 
rural poverty substantially, and
... pensioners have become comparatively wealthy mem­
bers o f  poor communities. This makes the presence o f  a 
pensioner a critical factor in many households ’ well-being, 
and the death o f  a pensioner is a potentially disastrous 
occurrence fo r  some. ... pensioners are a principal source 
o f cash income fo r  about a quarter o f homeland house­
holds. In rural areas, households with pensioners have 
higher average incomes than other households (Donald­
son, 1993: 285).
Recent work on the fiscal cost of social assistance indicates 
that despite an increasing number of older persons and local­
ised short-term fiscal crises (such as the recent one in the 
Eastern Cape), there is little danger of seriously escalating 
long-run fiscal burdens if the means test remains in place, eli­
gibility criteria are enforced and benefit levels stabilize 
around present levels (Van der Berg & Kruger, 1995; Interna­
tional Monetary Fund, 1995, Chapter 4). There may even be 
room for mild fiscal optimism: proper application of the 
means test could reduce average pensions levels and the num­
bers covered; improved access to occupational pensions of 
newly-retired cohorts would reduce the proportion qualify­
ing; and maladministration and corruption are receiving 
attention. Some of these issues are considered again below.
Articulation between occupational insurance 
and social pensions
The means test
An important social-security dilemma is the articulation 
between social insurance and social assistance for retirement. 
Central in this regard is the means test and how it interacts 
with occupational or private insurance and with the tax sys­
tem. A means test is a set of rules that determines how the 
material means available to applicants determine both their 
eligibility for benefits and the level of benefits which they 
receive. But “means-tested schemes have been subject to two 
important criticisms: that they fail to reach all who are eligi­
ble, and that they involve high marginal rates of taxation” 
(Atkinson, 1983: 268). Applicants have to provide a detailed 
account of all their sources of private income and their assets, 
and this needs to be “confirmed by a person familiar wi th the 
applicant. In rural areas this may be the Induna (headman) or 
tribal elder, who must accompany the person to the district 
pension office” (Legal Resources Centre, 1987:14). Difficul­
ties exist in the application of a means test in the South Afri­
can context.
Forms o f wealth are different in different situations. How 
can access to land, housing, cattle or other resources be 
evaluated when it is achieved by communal tenure at some 
times and by freehold or individual tenure at others? What 
is the relevance o f a test based largely on income from  
employment in a society where the majority have never had 
formal employment, and only a small percentage o f those 
who have had such employment receive occupational pen­
sions? Who will make these valuations in a society in which 
the majority o f  the aged are illiterate, and their lives unre­
corded in terms o f assets, income, investments, employ­
ment or taxation? ... The moral and practical arguments 
against the means test are compelling, despite the financial 
implications o f abolishing it (Ardington & Lund, 1995: 
22 ) .
Means-tested social pensions are usually provided on a slid­
ing scale. As income increases above a certain minimum 
level (the disregard or threshold income), the benefit level 
decreases (the clawback or effective marginal tax rate), until 
a point where no further pensions are paid (the exclusion or 
cut-off level). Moreover, an imputed income value is also 
applied to certain assets (8 % of the value of mainly financial 
assets) and added as “deemed income” to other income. Fur­
ther, in the 1996 regulations, income from subsistence agri­
culture is also excluded for means test purposes. Similarly, 
residential assets are now also disregarded in means testing 
and imputing income. Below the lower threshold (60 % of 
annual benefit, though the intention was that it should have 
been 30 %), applicants qualify for the full pension. Above this 
level, every R2 increase in pre-pension income reduces the 
benefit by R1 until the benefit is zero. Thus the marginal 
“tax” rate, or clawback for those with incomes above the 
threshold level but below the exclusion level is 50%, as in 
Australia, versus only 20 % in New Zealand (Mouton Com­
mittee, 1992: 47). For married applicants, only half the com­
bined income of the applicant and spouse is taken into 
consideration. Under apartheid, both the maximum grants 
and the means test differed between race groups. Lund (1992) 
discusses the problems experienced with means testing in 
practice.
Poverty trap aspects of the means test
As with all means-tested benefit systems, the marginal “tax” 
rate creates a typical poverty trap (see Le Roux, 1991: Sec­
tions 1.2 and 2.2; Sephton et a l, 1990: Annexure) that has 
severe implications for low-income workers. The poverty 
trap refers to the fact that the clawback or marginal tax rate 
makes it unattractive to people in certain income bands to try 
to earn more private income as they would lose part of it 
through a reduced grant. Arguments usually brought against 
the means test are that it creates administrative nightmares, 
encourages concealment of sources of income, and may cre­
ate disincentives to earn income or to provide for retirement, 
which is especially important in determining behaviour 
regarding occupational and other private pensions. More­
over, according to the Mouton Committee, the means-tested 
social old-age system “... discriminates against those who do 
make provision for their own retirement needs. The impact is 
particularly acute at low income levels where it acts as a seri­
ous disincentive to saving or continuing to work” (Mouton 
Committee, 1992: 85).
The majority of older South Africans have very low 
incomes if social pensions are excluded.2 Only among whites 
did more than a quarter of older persons have a per person 
income exceeding R900 per annum (expressed in 1996 
figures) before social pensions in 1996. Only 38.4 % of older 
whites earned less than this amount, while a substantial 
proportion of these individuals have relatively high private 
incomes, e.g. almost 30 % earn more than R2 000 per 
pensioner per month. Presumably, most of this income comes 
from private pensions and accumulated savings.
As occupational retirement insurance had largely excluded 
previous generations of black workers, few formerly retired 
with any private retirement provision. Moreover, those with 
limited means would hardly have gained from such private 
provision. Thus few black people are independent of state 
means of support in old age. But income distribution amongst 
retirees is changing rapidly as more retire who have benefited 
from the expansion of occupational insurance coverage in the 
past three decades. Conversely, smaller proportions of new 
cohorts who retire qualify for the full or even a reduced social 
pension. This reduces fiscal cost, but increases the difficulty
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of administering the means test, and retains some poverty trap 
features.
Is abolishing the means test a viable option?3
The close to universal eligibility for the social old-age pen­
sion in conjunction with the poverty trap present strong 
grounds for abolishing the means test in favour of a universal 
grant. Both the Mouton Committee and later the Smith Com­
mittee seriously considered this option, and more recently, in 
1997, the National Consultative Retirement Forum also 
expressed support in principle for a universal grant for older 
persons. This would simplify administration and remove the 
perverse incentives to withdraw retirement benefits before 
retirement, to neglect to take out private retirement insurance 
amongst informal sector participants and domestic servants 
where they have the resources to do so, to choose lump sum 
retirement benefits rather than pensions, or to hold assets in a 
form determined by the provisions of the means test. Abolish­
ing the means test should further encourage private retire­
ment provision for those who desire more resources in 
retirement than the social pension can offer,
But limited fiscal resources may preclude extending social 
pensions to all, especially at this time of political transition 
with the attendant need to provide greater social benefits for a 
large proportion of the population. The fiscal costs could be 
partly reduced by clawing back some spending through 
higher income tax, both by removing the old-age rebate and 
by the normal operation of the income tax scales, and some 
tax concessions presently enjoyed for private retirement 
provision may be reduced (cf. Vittas, 1994). Thus net fiscal 
costs may appear manageable. However, the South African 
population is now starting to age somewhat, therefore the 
numbers in the higher age categories are growing more 
rapidly than the aggregate population and economic growth 
presently can hardly keep pace with this. A universal grant 
may be fiscally unrealistic unless economic growth acceler­
ates and the tax capacity with it.
Another argument is that a universal pension would be 
distributional!y regressive, or rather less progressive than the 
present social pension. Those presently receiving the full 
pension (older individuals below the threshold where the 
clawback mechanism becomes operative) would be some­
what worse off if social pensions were lowered in order to 
give them to all older people. The quarter of older individuals 
not receiving a social pension, about equally split between 
those above the exclusion level and incomplete take-up by 
those eligible, would gain, including most retired white 
people, although such gains would be reduced through 
income tax. The distributory effect of reducing tax incentives 
for retirement provision would, on the other hand, be progres­
sive and would imply, for the better-off, an inter-generational 
transfer of resources. The longer-term, dynamic effects on 
distribution could also perhaps be positive by removing the 
disincentive to provide for retirement for those in low-wage 
employment.
As may be seen in Table 4, which compares the mean 
income (before social pension) of older people with those of 
working age, older South Africans have very limited private 
means. By far the majority are dependent on the social 
pension. But a substantial proportion of whites have high 
enough private retirement income that disqualifies them from 
receiving the social pension under the present means test. 
Some who have relatively low incomes do not qualify for the 
full pension. For these two groups, abolishing the means test 
would increase their retirement income. The cost to the state 
is largely determined by the size and the distribution of these 
groups, and how changed incentives affect their earnings.
Table 4
Older persons and working-age persons: numbers and 
monthly net income before social grants: 1996 estimate 
based on 1993 data




(males 65+, females 60+)
Black 1 B79 183 R 54
Coloured 13B 192 R 133
Indian 34 961 R 251
White 312 481 R1 414
TOTAL 2 1 64 818 R 259
Couples (per person) 694 997 R 500
Singles 1 469 822 R 144
W o r k in g -a g e  p e r s o n s
(males 18-64, females 18-59)
All 22 767 106 R 512
Of whom those 7 620 523 R1 529
earning an income
Source: Own calculations based on Living Standards and Develop­
ment Survey, 1993.
Considering the fiscal cost and the likely opposition due to 
reduced progressivity (less targeting), it may not yet be 
appropriate to abolish the means test in favour of a universal 
retirement pension. However, the focus of the means test 
should increasingly fall on “cutting down the tall poppies” -  
the way that the means test has been applied in Australia 
(where means-testing has been taken to its greatest lengths). 
This implies a focus on means of identifying and excluding 
the relatively wealthy, rather than on the clawback or sliding 
scale as a means of fine tuning benefits to means. This is par­
ticularly pertinent in the face o f the almost impossible task of 
regularlyreviewing eligibility and material means of millions 
of social grantholdcrs, making adjustments for inflation, and 
ensuring accurate information.
Conclusion
Ageing indeed provides many economic challenges to South 
Africa. These challenges are not those of developed affluent 
societies, which are grappling with the economic burden of 
ageing on a scale never experienced before -  and therefore 
have to make major adjustments to their social-security sys­
tem to keep them solvent. Neither are they similar to those of 
most developing countries, who seldom hav e as sophi sticated 
an occupational retirement insurance system, nor as large a 
social-assistance programme providing old-age pensions as 
South Africa has.
The uniqueness of the South African economic issues of 
ageing means that although we can learn much from other 
societies, there are respects in which we have to create our 
own system with its own characteristics. It is ironic that the 
legacies of our political past have left us in the field of social 
security more advanced than other middle-income countries, 
but with a backlog in terms of provision of social care to older 
people. Institutional changes are called for, rather than 
attempts to extend the institution-based model of care that 
evolved for whites to the whole population, which will not be 
affordable.
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Notes
1. Much o f this can be explained by the way that social security was insti­
tuted under apartheid and reluctantly gradually extended to other groups 
-a to p ic  which I discuss in more detail in Van der Berg (1997), where the 
entire social-security system and not only retirement provision is the 
topic. Other overviews o f the social-security system may be found in 
Kruger (1992b), Lund (1993) and Van der Merwe (1996).
2. Income distribution data were obtained from the 1993 Living Standards 
and Development Survey and adjusted to 1996 values by adjusting for 
inflation and racially-differentiated population growth. Per person 
income of couples was calculated (as in the means test) as the total 
income of the couple divided by two. Income includes all private sources 
o f income (excluding social grants), excluding subsistence agriculture 
and informal sector income, net of deductions from wages for taxes, 
Unemployment Insurance Fund contributions, etc. Using gross rather 
than net remuneration has a negligible effect: mean income of the elderly 
increases by only 2 % and the distribution hardly changes.
3. This is a larger topic than can be done justice to here, as the arguments 
against the means test have to be weighed against both the immediate and 
future costs of abolishing it. The author plans to address this matter more 
thoroughly in a later article.
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